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This study aimed to examine the interaction effect of response medium (i.e., write down
ideas and orally report ideas) and working memory capacity (WMC) on creative idea
generation. Participants (N = 90) with higher or lower WMC were asked to solve
Alternative Uses Task (AUT) problems in the condition of writing down or speaking out
ideas. The results showed that fluency of AUT performance was higher in the writing than
in the speaking condition. Additionally, participants with higher WMC performed better on
AUT fluency than those with lower WMC in the writing condition, while they showed no
difference in the speaking condition. Moreover, level of cognitive demand fully mediated
the effect of response medium on AUT fluency. Theoretically, these findings indicated the
importance of WMC in creative idea generation, which supported the controlled-attention
theory of creativity. Practical implications and future directions were discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Creativity is defined as the ability to produce work that is novel (original, unique) and useful
(Sternberg and Lubart, 1996; Runco and Jaeger, 2012). Idea generation is one of the fundamental
processes of creative thinking (Runco, 2003; Sowden et al., 2015), which has been emphasized
in various models of creativity. The blind variation and selective retention (BVSR) theory of
creativity (Campbell, 1960), for example, is a two-step model in essence, which emphasizes the
totally random or “blind” variation, followed by selection of better ideas and their retention by the
culture. The Darwinian theory of creativity (Simonton, 1999, 2007, 2010, 2012, 2013), which has
its roots in the BVSR theory, includes a similar two-step process in which the generation of ideas
is followed by evaluation of those ideas. The Genoplore model (Finke et al., 1992) suggests that
creative thinking consists of idea generation and idea exploration. It has been demonstrated that
participants’ performance on creative idea generation is a reliable predictor of actual, real-world
creative performance (Runco and Acar, 2012).
Divergent thinking (DT) tasks are commonly used to measure creative idea generation, such as
the Alternative Uses task (AUT) (Guilford, 1967), the Instances task (Wallach and Kogan, 1965),
and so on.While working on the DT tasks, respondents are usually encouraged to generate as many
unusual or original ideas as possible. In plenty of studies using DT tasks, participants were asked to
write down their generated ideas briefly by paper and pencil (Gilhooly et al., 2007; Leung et al., 2012;
Beaty et al., 2014; Radel et al., 2015). Yet in many other studies, participants were required to speak
out ideas one by one, and their oral responses were recorded by a voice recorder (Fink et al., 2007,
2011; Hao et al., 2014, 2015; Oppezzo and Schwartz, 2014). Here arises an interesting question:
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which medium, writing down ideas or speaking out ideas, is
better for creative idea generation? Notably, this question is not
just a methodological issue but also has its implication for daily
creative problem solving. For example, when people ponder on
problems, would writing down ideas or speaking them out with a
voice recorder facilitate the generation of creative solutions?
Creative idea generation is, according to the controlled-
attention theory of creative cognition (Beaty et al., 2014; Jauk
et al., 2014), a top-down process that involves many control
processes (Runco, 1994). These include inhibiting interference
from external unrelated stimuli (Fink et al., 2009, 2010; Benedek
et al., 2011, 2014a), inhibiting dominant but not novel responses
(Nusbaum and Silvia, 2011; Beaty and Silvia, 2012; Silvia and
Beaty, 2012), conducting directed search and retrieval processes
(Beaty and Silvia, 2013; Silvia et al., 2013), and evaluating and
refining initial ideas (Finke et al., 1992; Runco and Smith, 1992;
Gabora, 2005; Vartanian, 2011). Following these research lines,
working memory capacity (WMC), the ability or construct to
hold the current task-related information as well as to inhibit
task-irrelevant intervention (Baddeley, 2003), has been suggested
to affect creative idea generation. This proposal has been
supported by solid findings that WMC is positively correlated
with performance on creative idea generation (Oberauer et al.,
2008; De Dreu et al., 2012; Lee and Therriault, 2013).
Notably, taxing working memory resources by one activity
would reduce the resources to be used by another concurrent
activity (Van Dillen and Koole, 2007). Hence, writing down ideas
and speaking out ideas, which are supposed to have different
cognitive demands and consume different amount of working
memory resources, would have different effects on creative idea
generation. Conceivably, while speaking out ideas one by one,
people have to hold the current idea; meanwhile, they have to
search the memory and compare this idea with the ideas just
generated (i.e., old ideas) in case they report it repeatedly. These
cognitive processes call for a lot of working memory resources.
In contrast, though writing down ideas also involves comparison
of the current idea and old ideas, people do not need to hold
the idea and search the memory because all old ideas have been
written down on the paper. Consequently, writing down ideas
might have lower cognitive demand and consume less working
memory resources compared with speaking out ideas, which
benefits creative idea generation as a result.
Individual differences of WMC should be considered when
exploring the effect of response medium (i.e., writing down or
speaking out) on creative idea generation. It is demonstrated
that participants with higher WMC performed better on fluency
and originality of idea generation (De Dreu et al., 2012). What
we hypothesize here is that there might be an interaction effect
of response medium and WMC on creative idea generation.
Specifically, in the context of writing down ideas, a small quantity
of working memory resources is consumed. Thus, people with
higher WMC would perform better on creative idea generation
than those with lower WMC. In the context of speaking out
ideas one by one, however, the response medium calls for much
more working memory resources, thus people with higher WMC
might have no vantage of available WMC to perform better than
those with lower WMC. Therefore, the aims of the present study
are not only to investigate the effect of response medium on
creative idea generation, but also to explore the interaction effect
of response medium and individual WMC level on creative idea
generation.
In this study, participants were asked to work on a DT task
in the writing or speaking condition. Their WMC was then
measured by means of a WMC task. To check whether different
response mediums might elicit different emotional states, which
have complex effects on creative cognition (Baas et al., 2008; De
Dreu et al., 2008), participants’ emotional valence and arousal
were measured before and after the experiment. Moreover,
cognitive demands elicited by writing down and speaking out
ideas were also measured in order to test whether different
response mediums would influence creative ideation because of
their different cognitive demands.
The main hypotheses were as follows. First, participants
would perform better on creative idea generation in the writing
than in the speaking condition, given that writing down ideas
might have lower cognitive demand compared with speaking out
ideas. Second, participants with higher WMC would perform
better on idea generation than those with lower WMC. Third,
there might be an interaction effect of response medium and
WMC on idea generation. Specifically, because of high cognitive
demand of speaking out ideas, participants with higher or lower
WMC might show no difference on ideation performance in
this case; however, in the writing condition where writing down
ideas had low cognitive demand, participants with higher WMC
would perform better than those with lower WMC. Fourth,
cognitive demand of response medium might mediate the effect
of response medium on creative ideation.
METHODS
Participants
Ninety right-handed college students (32 male and 58 female;
M = 21.49 years, SD = 1.20, Range: 19–24 years), who majored
in various academic disciplines, participated individually in
this study. They were all native Chinese speakers. They were
randomly assigned to one of the two experimental conditions:
writing down ideas or speaking out ideas. The gender ratio was
same in the two groups. The t-test revealed that the mean age
of the two groups did not differ from each other [t(88) = 1.23,
p = 0.22], nor did the mean WMC levels [t(88) = 1.21, p =
0.23] (see Table 1). All participants were gave written informed
consent and were paid about 4 dollars for their participation.
The protocol of the experiment was approved by the Institutional
Ethics Committee at East China Normal University.
TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics of individuals in the speaking and writing
groups.
Group Number of Female/Male Age (M ± SD) WMC (M ± SD)
Speaking 29/16 21.33 ± 1.24 3.69 ± 1.69
Writing 29/16 21.64 ± 1.15 4.13 ± 1.80
Individuals’ WMC was measured by the Reading Span Task.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 October 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1582
Hao et al. Response medium and creativity
Experimental Tasks
The Alternative Uses Task (AUT) (Guilford, 1967) was used as
the target task. It required respondents to generate as many
unusual or original uses as possible for common objects, such as a
paperclip (“making a ring,” “cleaning fingernails”). The AUT is a
well-established test of creative potential (Guilford, 1967; Runco,
1991, 1999; Runco andMraz, 1992). Performance on this task has
been demonstrated to be a reliable predictor of actual, real-world
creative performance (Runco and Acar, 2012).
The Reading Span Task (Daneman and Carpenter, 1980) was
adopted to measure participants’ WMC. Operationally defined
as the number of items that can be recalled during complex
span tasks, WMC mainly fulfills two classes of function: to
actively maintain information, and to discriminate task-relevant
and task-irrelevant information (Unsworth and Engle, 2007). As
the Reading Span Task requires participants to judge whether
or not the sentences presented on the screen are reasonable
while holding the last words of the sentences in their mind,
it is regarded as a typical task to measure WMC (Daneman
and Carpenter, 1980; Baddeley, 2003). Specifically, following a
fixation lasting for 1000ms, a sentence appeared on the screen.
Participants needed to make the judgment by pressing key 1
or 0 (1 = true; 0 = false) while memorizing the last word
in 4000ms. Or else, a warning message would appear on the
screen, suggesting that no response was detected. When a series
of sentences were finished, participants were required to enter
the words sequentially into the computer with a semicolon
following each word. The task consisted of six levels from
level 2 to level 7 (i.e., memorizing 2–7 words). Each level
contained three groups of sentences. The number of sentences
in each group was in line with the level. For example, a
group contained two sentences if the level was 2. Only when
participants entered all the words of each group correctly could
they make a point. Participants were permitted to step up to a
higher level if they got points of 2 or above. If they failed, the
task ended. The last fully completed level was the participant’s
performance score. For example, if a participant stopped at
level 5, it means he or she completed the 3 groups of level 4
successfully, and would achieve the score of “4” for Reading
Span Task.
Experimental Procedure
Participants were informed that they would solve two AUT
problems (i.e., brick and chopstick), and then complete the
Reading Span Task. In the instruction about how to solve the
AUT problems, participants were encouraged to try their best
to produce ideas that would be thought of by no one else, as
suggested by Harrington (1975), Runco and Pritzker (1999), and
Torrance (1995).
Participants solved these two AUT problems in 20min (i.e.,
10min per problem), with a 1-min break between the two
problems. In the writing condition, participants were asked
to write down their ideas briefly by paper and pencil. In the
speaking condition, participants were asked to report their ideas
orally. The oral responses for the AUT problems were recorded
by a voice recorder and transcribed afterwards for further
analysis.
Pre- and Post-experimental Tests
Prior to the experiment and immediately after the experiment,
participants self-rated the valence and arousal levels of their
emotional states by means of the Self-Assessment Manikin
(Bradley and Lang, 1994), in which they selected one of nine
ratings (valence: 1 = very unpleasant, 9 = very pleasant; arousal:
1 = not exciting at all, 9 = very exciting) illustrated by five
cartoon figures and the points between any two figures.
Moreover, after participants completed the experiment, their
effortlessness involved in writing down or speaking out ideas was
measured by asking: “How effortful was it to write down (or
speak out) ideas” on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all effortful)
to 5 (very effortful). Such a technique (i.e., self-reported mental
effort ratings) is widely used to measure the level of cognitive
demand of a task. It has been proven to be most sensitive to
reflect the cognitive demand of intrinsic processing elicited by the
task relative to another two techniques for measuring cognitive
demand (i.e., response time to a secondary task during task
performance, and difficulty ratings of task; Paas et al., 2003;
Ayres, 2006; DeLeeuw and Mayer, 2008).
AUT Performance Assessment
Participants’ performance on the AUT problems was measured
on the scores of fluency and originality (Guilford, 1967; Runco,
1991; Runco and Pritzker, 1999). Fluency scores were based on
the total number of ideas of the given AUT problems. Originality
scores were based on statistically infrequent responses. To this
end, the ideas generated by all participants were collected into
a comprehensive lexicon. Synonyms were identified and ideas
collapsed accordingly. If a response was statistically infrequent
(i.e., if 5% or less participants in the sample gave the response),
it was given a score of “1.” All other responses received scores
of “0,” regardless of how often they appeared. Following this
scoring procedure, two trained raters independently assessed
the originality of the two AUT problems for every participant.
The inter-rater agreement (ICCs = 0.96) was satisfactory. The
internal consistency of the fluency in solving these two problems
was satisfactory (Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was 0.80), as was
that of the originality (alpha was 0.70). Finally, the fluency or
originality scores in solving two problemswere averaged for every
participant.
RESULTS
Effects of Response Medium and WMC on
AUT Performance
According to the performance on the Reading Span Task,
participants were split into higher WMC group (level 5, 6, and
7; 42 participants, 18 male and 24 female) and lower WMC
group (level 2, 3, and 4; 48 participants, 14 male and 34
female).
A Two-Way ANOVA with response medium (writing vs.
speaking) andWMC (higher vs. lower) as between-subject factors
was performed on the fluency scores. As shown in Figure 1,
there was a significant main effect of WMC, F(1, 86) = 4.21,
p < 0.05, η2p = 0.05. Overall, participants with higher WMC
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generated more ideas (M = 17.70, SD = 7.14) than those with
lower WMC did (M = 15.10, SD = 6.62). Also, there was
a significant main effect of response medium, F(1, 86) = 5.14,
p < 0.05, η2p = 0.06. That is, participants produced more ideas
in the writing condition (M = 17.64, SD = 5.53) than in the
speaking condition (M = 15.00, SD = 6.28). More interestingly,
a significant interaction effect of response medium and WMC
was observed, F(1, 86) = 5.11, p < 0.05, η
2
p = 0.06. Specifically, in
the writing condition, participants with higher WMC generated
more ideas (M = 20.30, SD = 6.35) than those with lower WMC
(M = 15.11, SD = 3.00), t(43) = 3.53, p < 0.01, Cohen’s
d = 1.05. However, in the speaking condition, the fluency scores
FIGURE 1 | Alternative Uses Task (AUT) fluency scores of participants
with higher or lower working memory capacity (WMC) in the speaking
and writing conditions. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
**p < 0.01.
showed no difference between participants with higher or lower
WMC (M = 14.85, SD = 7.00; vs. M = 15.10, SD = 5.79),
t(43) = −0.13, p = 0.9.
To further investigate the interaction effect of response
medium and WMC, we took participant’s WMC level as a
continuous variable, and conducted a univariate ANOVA with
response medium as the between-subject factor and WMC as
a covariate. The results showed that the interaction effect of
response medium and WMC on fluency was also significant,
F(2, 87) = 6.33, p < 0.01, η
2
p = 0.13. In the speaking condition,
fluency scores were not correlated with WMC; while in the
writing condition, the higher participants’ WMC was, the more
ideas they generated (r = 0.45, p < 0.01) (see Figure 2).
For the originality scores, there was no main effect of response
medium or WMC. Interaction effect of these two factors was not
significant either.
Mediation Effect of Cognitive Demand
between Response Medium and AUT
Fluency
Cognitive demand of response mediums was measured by the
self-reported mental effort ratings (Paas et al., 2003; Ayres, 2006;
DeLeeuw and Mayer, 2008). Participants’ self-rated effortfulness
of speaking out and writing down ideas was compared. It was
found that effortfulness in the speaking condition (M = 3.33,
SD = 1.15) was higher than that in the writing condition (M =
2.07, SD = 0.92), t(88) = 5.79, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.21.
Based on the method developed by Baron and Kenny (1986),
the mediation effect of cognitive demand on the relation between
response medium and AUT fluency was examined with three
linear regressions. All variables were centered in order to avoid
multicollinearity with the interaction term. First, the outcome
variable (i.e., fluency) was regressed on the predictor (i.e.,
response medium). The result (Path C1) was found to be
significant (β = 0.22, p < 0.05). Second, the relationship
FIGURE 2 | Correlations between working memory capacity (WMC) and fluency scores in the speaking and writing conditions.
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(Path A) between the predictor and the mediator variable (i.e.,
cognitive demand) was significant (β = 0.53, p < 0.01), as
was path B between the mediator variable and the outcome
variable (β = −0.35, p < 0.01). Finally, fluency was regressed
on both cognitive demand and response medium. The result
turned out that prediction effect of response medium (Path C2)
became insignificant (β = 0.06, p = 0.61) (see Figure 3).
These results indicated that cognitive demand fully mediated the
relation between response medium and AUT fluency.
Emotions in the Writing and Speaking
Conditions
Levels of valence and arousal of emotional states in pre- and
post-experimental epochs in the speaking and writing conditions
were shown in Table 2. An ANOVA for repeated measures with
epoch (pre- vs. post-experimental) as a within-subject factor, and
response medium as a between-subject factor, was conducted on
the valence levels. The results showed that there was a significant
main effect of epoch, F(1, 88) = 24.43, p < 0.01, η
2
p = 0.22, but
there was neither main effect of response medium nor interaction
effect of response medium and epoch. Another ANOVA for
repeated measures revealed that epoch had a significant main
effect on the arousal levels, F(1, 88) = 9.89, p < 0.01, η
2
p =
0.10, but response medium did not. Interaction effect of response
medium and epoch was not statistically significant either.
To further investigate whether emotional states might
confound the effect of response medium on AUT fluency, pre-
and post-experimental valence and arousal levels were entered
FIGURE 3 | Mediation effect of cognitive demand between response
medium and AUT fluency. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
TABLE 2 | Levels of valence and arousal of emotional states in pre- and
post-experimental epochs under the speaking and writing conditions
(M ± SD).
Emotion Speaking Writing
Pre Post Pre Post
Valence 5.47 ± 1.56 4.71 ± 1.58 6.20 ± 1.42 5.02 ± 1.97
Arousal 4.24 ± 1.87 5.00 ± 2.06 4.22 ± 1.99 5.20 ± 2.02
into the ANOVA model as a covariate successively. The results
revealed that none of these four variables diminished the main
effect of response medium or interaction effects of response
medium and WMC on AUT fluency.
DISCUSSION
The present study aimed to investigate which response medium,
writing or speaking, was better for creative idea generation; as
well to explore how response medium and WMC exerted an
interaction effect on creative idea generation. It was revealed
that participants in the writing condition generated more ideas
than those in the speaking condition. And, there was an
interaction effect of response medium and WMC on AUT
fluency. Participants with higher WMC produced more ideas
than those with lower WMC in the writing condition, but such
difference was not observed in the speaking condition. More
interestingly, it was demonstrated that level of cognitive demand
mediated the effect of response medium on AUT fluency. To our
knowledge, the findings in this study make an innovative and
significant contribution to the research on creativity.
Compared with speaking out ideas, writing down ideas helped
people generate more responses (see Figure 1). This finding was
consistent with the first hypothesis of the study. In the writing
condition, the generated ideas had been written down on the
paper, so participants did not have to employ many working
memory resources to hold the current idea and search memory
to compare it with old ideas. Therefore, more WMC could
be spared to the cognitive processes involved in creative idea
generation, such as inhibiting interference of external unrelated
stimuli (Fink et al., 2009, 2010; Benedek et al., 2011, 2014b),
overriding the generation of most accessible but common ideas
(Nusbaum and Silvia, 2011; Beaty and Silvia, 2012; Silvia and
Beaty, 2012), combining concepts retrieved from long-term
memory (Mednick, 1962; Paulus and Brown, 2007), and so on.
However, in the speaking condition, participants had to mentally
compare every newly generated idea with the old ideas in the
memory, which demanded a lot of working memory resources,
particularly in a long period of task performance (i.e., 10min)
in this study. Notably, participants’ self-rated effortfulness was
higher for speaking out ideas than writing down ideas. This
meant speaking out ideas elicited higher cognitive demand (Paas
et al., 2003; Ayres, 2006; DeLeeuw and Mayer, 2008). As a result,
less WMC was used in cognitive processes involved in idea
generation in the speaking condition, which might then impair
AUT fluency.
The explanation above was strongly supported by the results
of mediation effect analysis (see Figure 3). It was demonstrated
that cognitive demand fully mediated the effect of response
medium on AUT fluency. In addition, higher cognitive demand
was associated to lower fluency scores. These findings indicated
that writing down or speaking out ideas, seemly just different in
the facet of response medium, did affect creative idea generation
through the cognitive demand they elicited.
The current study revealed that higher WMC was conducive
to creative idea generation, similar to the findings of previous
studies (Oberauer et al., 2008; De Dreu et al., 2012; Lee
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and Therriault, 2013). More importantly, this study found an
interaction effect between response medium and WMC on
AUT fluency (see Figures 1, 2). Specifically, only in the writing
condition did participants with higher WMC perform better
on AUT fluency than lower WMC; while these two groups of
participants showed no difference in the speaking condition.
These might because speaking out ideas one by one elicited
high cognitive demand and occupied a large amount of working
memory resources, which was a challenging task for participants
with either higher or lowerWMC. Thus, the AUT fluency showed
no difference between these two groups of participants. By
contrast, writing down was a relatively less resource-consuming
way to report ideas. Consequently, in the writing condition,
participants with higher WMC spared more cognitive control
resources and then generated more ideas than those with
lower WMC.
Valance and arousal of emotion showed no difference between
the writing and speaking conditions, no matter in the pre- or
post-experimental epoch (see Table 2). In addition, emotional
states of the two epochs did not confound the effect of response
medium and its interaction with WMC on AUT fluency. These
findings refuted the possibility that the effects of writing down
and speaking out ideas on creative idea generation could be
resulted from the different emotional states induced by different
response mediums.
There has been a theoretical debate on whether creative
thinking relied mainly on implicit or explicit processing.
Some researchers argued that implicit associative process,
which was beneficial for accessing distantly related information
(Dijksterhuis and Meurs, 2006), could spark creative ideas
or solutions. On the contrary, other researchers claimed that
explicit executive process, such as overriding the habitual
responses (Gilhooly et al., 2007; De Dreu et al., 2012), would
be indispensable for creative thinking. It is well acknowledged
that explicit processing is highly correlated with WMC, whereas
implicit processing is not (Kane et al., 2001; Evans, 2008).
Thus, to test the role of WMC in creative idea generation
would provide evidence to distinguish the implicit from the
explicit account. Many previous studies showed that WMC
was not related to creativity performance. For instance, Furley
and Memmert (2015) revealed that domain-general WMC was
not associated with creativity in a soccer-specific creativity
task. DeYoung et al. (2008) found that WMC (measured by
a self-ordered pointing task) was not associated with DT
performance. Takeuchi et al. (2011) reported that the reduced
task-inducted deactivation (TID) in the precuneus, which
indicated the inefficient reallocation of working memory (WM)
resources, was associated with better DT performance. These
studies seemed to support the implicit account of creativity.
However, there were also plenty of studies showing that WMC
was positively correlated with performance on creative idea
generation (Oberauer et al., 2008; De Dreu et al., 2012; Lee
and Therriault, 2013). In line with these studies, our findings
indicated the importance of WMC in creative idea generation.
Theoretically, the present study supported the explicit account of
creativity. Notably, some recent researchers proposed that both
implicit and explicit processing were simultaneously involved in
most creativity tasks (Hélie and Sun, 2010; Allen and Thomas,
2011; Sowden et al., 2015). Future research should explore the
underlying mechanism on how implicit and explicit processing
may interact to generate creative ideas.
It must be pointed out that speaking out ideas is a priority to
writing down ideas in some given experimental contexts. First,
with the application of neuroscience methods (e.g., fMRI, EEG)
in psychology, experimental tasks by means of paper-and-pencil
become inappropriate. For example, participants are allowed
little motion of body even their heads in fMRI experiments. In
this case, writing down ideas with hand is not allowed; orally
reporting ideas and recording them with a voice recorder is
a good alternative (Fink et al., 2007). Second, in the studies
where participants are allowed a very short period of time (i.e.,
4, 10 s) to give responses, speaking out ideas excels writing
down ideas, given that writing is more time consuming than
speaking. In addition, it should be noted that the originality
of idea generation showed no difference between two response
conditions in the current study. It may imply that both writing
down and speaking out ideas are appropriate ways in the
studies that emphasize originality instead of fluency of idea
generation.
There are three limitations of this study. First, there might
be a problem of reliability in using only one task (i.e., AUT).
Further research should adopt more than one verbal DT tasks
(e.g., Instances task; Wallach and Kogan, 1965) to justify the
reliability of our findings. Second, this study adopted a 10-min
paradigm of performing AU task. Notably, time affects creativity
(Runco, 1999). As the time passes by, fluency of idea generation
decreases and originality of idea generation increases (Parnes,
1961; Ward, 1969; Beaty and Silvia, 2012). Further research
should manipulate different periods of time (e.g., 3, 5min) to
testify whether the interaction effect of response medium and
WMC on idea generation is solid in various periods of task
performance. Third, this study did not measure individuals’
intelligence. As participants were randomly assigned into the
speaking or writing condition, it is reasonable to propose that
intelligence of the two groups was statistically equal. However,
given that intelligence is related to working memory (Süßet al.,
2002; Oberauer et al., 2008) and creativity (Jauk et al., 2013),
future study should involve intelligence as a variable to explore
whether it affects the interaction effect of WMC and response
medium on creativity.
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